Deposit Insurance, Banks' Moral Hazard, and Regulation: Evidence from the ASEAN Countries and Korea
- 주제(키워드) deposit insurance , moral hazard , regulatory quality , risk-taking
- 등재 SSCI, SCOPUS
- 발행기관 ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
- 발행년도 2015
- 총서유형 Journal
- URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/ewha/000000114809
- 본문언어 영어
- Published As http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2014.1013875
초록/요약
In this paper, we analyze the effect of deposit insurance (DI) on banks' risk-taking for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and Korea. Previous studies focus primarily on developed countries or use mixed samples. The utilization of a panel data set consisting of 406 banks across our sample countries reveals that banks engage more actively in risk-taking in the presence of DI, that the adverse effect of DI is aggravated with extensive coverage, and that DI-related moral hazard is curbed through better regulatory quality. Particularly, risk-taking is relatively higher in Korea, but no difference is detected in the stabilizing effect of the regulatory quality. Relevant policy implications are offered.
more