A lattice attack on homomorphic NTRU with non-invertible public keys
- 주제(키워드) Homomorphic NTRU , IND-CPA security , Lattices , LLL algorithm , NTRU
- 지원기관 Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning
- 관리정보기술 faculty
- 등재 SCOPUS
- 발행기관 Springer Verlag
- 발행년도 2018
- URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/ewha/000000155672
- ISBN 9783319894997
- 본문언어 영어
- Published As http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89500-0_22
초록/요약
In 2011, Stehlé and Steinfeld modified the original NTRU to get a provably IND-CPA secure NTRU under the hardness assumption of standard worst-case problems over ideal lattices. In 2012, López-Alt et al. proposed the first multikey fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the IND-CPA secure NTRU. Interestingly, this homomorphic NTRU and subsequent homomorphic variants of NTRU removed the condition ‘invertible public key’ of the underlying IND-CPA secure NTRU. In this paper, we investigate the security influence of using non-invertible public key in the homomorphic NTRU. As a result, we present how to mount a lattice attack to message recovery for the homomorphic NTRU when the public key is non-invertible. Our result suggests that using invertible public keys in the homomorphic NTRU is necessary for its security. © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018.
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