초록/요약

[Purpose]This study examines the incentives for earnings management that may occur when a company receives its first credit rating from a credit rating agency (CRA). Based on the framework of asymmetric cost behavior, we empirically analyze whether a company makes cost adjustments for the purpose of raising earnings reported when it is evaluated for the initial credit ratings. [Methodology]The sample consists of companies for which credit and financial data are available among Korean listed manufacturing companies from 2002 to 2019. We analyze changes in cost behavior during the accounting periods ±2 from the time of initial credit rating evaluation. [Findings]We found that companies exhibit less stickiness in selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs during the initial credit evaluation periods than before and after ±2 accounting periods from the initial rating when sales decrease. The findings are consistent with the companies’ deliberate reductions of discretionary costs to report higher earnings numbers for more favorable credit ratings. [Implications]By presenting the empirical evidence regarding corporate earnings management incentives around the initial credit rating evaluation, the current study expands and supplements the existing managers’ earnings management literature confined to credit rating changes only. In addition, by using the framework of asymmetric cost behavior in relation to earnings management incentives, the field of researches to explain factors affecting cost behavior is also expanded.