초록/요약

Since Kim Jong Un gained power, he introduced several policy directions, or “lines.” There are different interpretations of the nature of the lines, especially in light of Max Weber’s “routinization of leadership.” Unlike Kim Jong Il, some studies argue that Kim Jong Un has tried to routinize this authority to transcend charismatic leadership. Especially, his introduction of the “new strategic line of everything for the economy” in April 2018 is an ultimate example of his attempt to routinize leadership. However, this article challenges the argument in three ways. First, the interpretation of Kim Jong Un’s lines, including the “economy first” strategic line proposed in April 2018, is not enough to represent the efforts to the routinization of authority. Second, after the breakup of the Hanoi summits in 2019, North Korea has moved to radicalize its policy. Finally, North Korea could choose not to routinize its authority in a more fundamental sense. By analyzing the critical events such as the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee on April 20, 2018, the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee in December 2019, and the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, the paper has demonstrated that Kim Jong Un has continued to implement, and even strengthen some radical policies. © 2022 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.